PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT THE IMPORTANCE OF MANAGEMENT LEADERSHIP

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PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT

- Since 1990, Process safety management (PSM) is adopted by many companies in process industry to <u>reduce major accident risk</u> and <u>improved chemical industry performance</u>.
- Today, many companies continue to <u>face problems</u> of <u>inadequate</u> management system <u>performance</u>, <u>resource pressures</u>, and <u>stagnant</u> process safety <u>results</u>.
- This presentation highlights the <u>important role management leadership</u> in leading a <u>successful</u> and <u>effective</u> PSM program.



PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT

- PSM is <u>NOT</u> a <u>one time program</u> that can be <u>forgotten</u> when completed, it requires management's <u>continual commitment</u> to <u>process safety</u> and <u>improvement</u> over throughout the <u>entire life cycle of the facilities.</u>
- It is an <u>on-going process</u> that involves <u>auditing</u> and <u>revaluation</u> of the management system to <u>continually enhance</u> the <u>effectiveness</u> of the PSM system.
- PSM is a journey towards "Our process and operation are safe and we know it".
- It is a key enabler to "SUSTAINING FUTURE GROWTH".
- The journey never <u>ENDS</u>.



PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT ELEMENTS

- Employee Participation
- Process Safety Information (PSI)
- Process Hazards Analysis (PHA)
- Operating Procedures
- Training
- Contractors
- Pre-startup Safety Review

- Mechanical Integrity (MI)
- Hot work Permit
- Management of Change (MOC)
- Incident Investigation
- Emergency Planning and Response
- Compliance Audits
- Trade Secrets



REASONS FOR THE DECLINE OF PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS

- <u>Compliance-based approach</u> to managing process safety ... "If isn't a regulatory requirement,
 I'm not going to do it!" <u>passive response.</u>
- Resources are sometimes <u>disproportionately focused</u> on <u>personal safety</u> instead of <u>process</u>
 <u>safety</u>.
- <u>Injury rates</u> are steadily <u>declining</u>, management assumes this also indicates that <u>the risk of low-frequency</u>, <u>high-consequence process safety incidents</u> must likewise be <u>declining</u>.



REASONS FOR THE DECLINE OF PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS

- Management systems are <u>over-emphasized</u> while the <u>technical aspects</u> of process safety are <u>neglected</u>.
- Organizations <u>lack</u> a <u>thorough understanding</u> of <u>recognized and generally accepted good</u>
 <u>engineering practices</u> and are <u>inconsistent</u> in interpreting and applying them.
- <u>Complacency</u> absence of major accidents
 - <u>Statistics</u> demonstrates that worker safety in the <u>process industries</u> is <u>better</u> than all other <u>industrial sectors</u>.



REASONS FOR THE DECLINE OF PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS

- Process safety professionals <u>communicate poorly</u> with senior management.
- Management does NOT receive and act on the messages.
- If such issues are left <u>unchecked</u>, organizations are losing their <u>focus</u> on process safety,
 resulting in
 - A <u>serious decline</u> in process safety <u>performance</u> or
 - A <u>loss of emphasis</u> on achieving process safety <u>excellence</u>.



- Creating a strong Process Safety Management is a journey.
- The journey starts off having a <u>reactive culture</u> develop and implement PSM to <u>meet and</u> <u>comply</u> with <u>regulatory requirements</u>.
- The journey continues to <u>improve</u> PSM performance towards <u>proactive</u>.
 - "This is the way we do business here".
- <u>Effectiveness</u> and <u>performance</u> of PSM <u>deteriorates over time</u> when <u>NOT</u> ensuring <u>proper attention</u>.



- The **CAUSES** can be related to
 - Change of leadership.
 - Change of direction/new priority settings in company.
 - Poor ownership of PSM processes.
 - Lack of training.
 - Lack of review.



- A <u>sustainability program</u> is required to make sure that PSM is <u>effectively embedded</u> in leadership, people, process, structures and culture.
- Develop a <u>mind-set</u> where <u>LEADERS</u> at all levels can
 - Adopt a <u>proactive</u> risk based approach.
 - Are made aware of <u>weak signals</u>.
 - Can <u>challenges</u> and <u>interventions</u> on risk assessments and decision making.
 - Reward and recognize employee contributions.



- The key to successful PSM is <u>LEADERSHIP</u>.
- The <u>LEADERS</u> from line organisation are expected to
 - Know the main hazards of the operation.
 - Involve in <u>PSM activities</u> and control the business risks <u>actively.</u>
 - Learn how the <u>PSM elements evolve</u> through <u>careful analysis</u> of <u>past mistakes</u>.
 - Understand the current <u>status</u> of the facility.
 - Understand the <u>business benefits</u> of performance measurement.



- Develop <u>key performance indicators</u> and <u>metrics</u>.
- Secure <u>resources</u>.
- Implement a <u>performance measurement system.</u>
- Engage employee who has <u>direct knowledge</u> on how systems <u>deteriorate</u> or become <u>ineffective</u>.
- Provide <u>clear direction</u> and <u>focus</u> the company's activities in that direction.
- Look out for weak signals that people are concerned with the current situation.
- Identify and focus on <u>areas of greatest concern.</u>



- Have the <u>courage to accept</u> that <u>past practices</u> may have been <u>ineffective</u>.
- Communicate to <u>all company levels</u> the PSM goals.
 - Use of well designed newsletters, and bulletins to disseminate
 - Lesson learnt from <u>past incidents</u> and <u>near misses</u>
 - Safety <u>performance achievement</u> information
 - Management <u>listen actively</u> to the <u>feedback</u>, and <u>take serious measures</u> to address the points raised.



- Visible management Managers <u>set examples</u> for employee to follow.
 - Present of <u>key personnel</u> when <u>technical assistances</u> are <u>required most</u> by <u>operation</u>
 <u>staff</u> during:
 - Commission new process equipment e.g., compressor, furnace
 - Startup
 - Commission a new process
 - Operation upsets
 - Walk your talk what you say must align with what you do.
- Provide a work environment <u>conducive</u> to these principles.



- Benefits of a successful PSM program are both tangible and intangible:
 - Profitability
 - Employee morale
 - Public image

PROFITABILITY

- The <u>initial stage</u> of PSM implementation experience <u>substantial costs</u>.
- It is the <u>front end cost</u> which has resulted from <u>lack of PSM</u> in <u>past operation</u>.



- Once PSM is successfully implemented
 - Process <u>reliability</u> is improved many <u>operability issues</u> are <u>uncovered</u> during the process hazards analysis.
 - Facility's <u>profitability</u> is improved <u>minimize</u>
 - Off-specification product.
 - Unplanned downtime (business interruption).
 - Indirect overhead expenses is reduced or maintained at minimum levels.
 - Reduce premiums paid for <u>worker's compensation insurance</u>.
 - Reduce <u>size of medical bills</u> through <u>eliminating</u> or <u>reducing</u> the incident's <u>severity</u>.



EMPLOYEE MORALE

- Improve understanding, communication and information sharing at <u>ALL</u> levels.
- Employees can put their <u>safety concerns</u> on the table and discuss them in an <u>open</u>, <u>informed environment</u> and <u>reduces misunderstandings</u>.
- Employees maintain a <u>positive outlook</u> toward the company.
- Avoid the <u>spread of negative rumours</u>.



PUBLIC IMAGE

- Highly unlikely catastrophic event when happens will result in <u>substantial negative media</u>
 <u>coverage</u> that <u>focuses on the company's practices</u> and puts <u>employees on the defensive</u>.
- The more common cause of negative public image is <u>frequent operating upsets</u> that <u>result</u>
 <u>in odour complaints</u>. These incidents raise public health concerns.
 - By reducing substance or odour releases, the company can focus on the <u>positive</u> <u>aspects</u> of its operation (jobs, useful products, etc.).
- Result: MHI <u>spends less time</u> on <u>reporting</u> to <u>regulators</u>.



KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND METRICS

- Establish <u>KPIs/Metrics indicators</u> to
 - Monitor the <u>near-real-time effectiveness</u> of the PSM.
 - Provide inputs to <u>continuous</u> improvement <u>over the life</u> of a process.
 - Overcome the <u>decline</u> of PSM programs.
 - Provide <u>timely feedback</u> on the workings of PSM management systems.
 - Provide <u>early warning signals</u> of ineffective process safety results.
- Periodic review and honest self-evaluation helps to
 - Sustain existing performance.
 - Drive improvement in important areas.




- Combine both <u>leading</u> and <u>lagging</u> indicators to provide a <u>complete picture</u> of process safety effectiveness.
 - <u>Leading indicators</u> are used to
 - Monitor the <u>effectiveness</u> of risk control systems <u>proactively</u>.
 - Provide <u>feedback</u> on safety performance <u>before</u> an incident or accident <u>happens</u>.
 - Evaluate the <u>present state</u> of workplace through <u>routine</u> and <u>systematic inspections</u> actively.
 - <u>Leading indicators</u> require a <u>routine systematic check</u> that <u>key actions</u> or <u>activities</u> are undertaken as <u>intended</u>.




- Lagging indicators are outcome oriented and use to
 - Monitor the <u>effectiveness</u> of risk control systems.
 - Identify gaps and weaknesses in these systems.
 - Report on incidents or accidents to <u>check</u> that the <u>controls in place</u> are <u>adequate</u>.
- <u>Lagging indicators</u> show when a <u>desired</u> safety outcome has <u>failed</u>, or has <u>NOT</u> been achieved.
- Measurement helps people <u>recognize</u> their <u>contributions</u> to the <u>outcomes</u> and <u>creates passion</u>
 for <u>continuous improvement</u>.



- <u>Leading</u> and <u>Lagging</u> indicators for PSM Elements listed in the following references can be adopted by Companies.
 - Workplace Safety and Health Guideline Process Safety Performance Indicators
 - CCPS Risk Based Process Safety








- Hazards are contained by <u>multiple</u> protective <u>barriers</u>.
- Barriers may have <u>weaknesses</u> or <u>'holes'.</u>
- When holes <u>align</u> an accident occurs, resulting in the potential for harm.
- Barriers may be <u>physical engineered</u> <u>containment</u> or <u>behavioural controls</u> dependent on people.
- Holes can be <u>latent/incipient</u>, or <u>actively</u> <u>opened</u> by <u>people</u>.

LAGGING INDICATORS

Warning indicators - the holes have developed



Preventive indicators before the holes develop



- The <u>root causes</u> of serious accidents usually involve
 - Degraded effectiveness of management systems.
 - Complete failure of management system activities.
- Facilities should
 - Monitor the <u>real-time performance</u> of management system activities <u>NOT</u> to wait for
 - Accidents to happen.
 - Infrequent audits to identify latent management system failures.
 - Identify the <u>weaknesses</u> of the evolving management system.
 - Adjust PSM element work activities before they are <u>degraded</u> into a failed state.



- Such performance monitoring allows
 - Problems to be identified.
 - <u>Corrective actions</u> to be taken <u>before</u> a serious incident occurs.
- Such approach <u>encourage</u> company to:
 - Focus the resources on <u>higher</u> risk activities.
 - Manage every hazard <u>without</u> setting <u>priorities</u> is an <u>inefficient use</u> of scarce resources.
 - Improve management system effectiveness <u>continuously</u>.
 - Make process safety an <u>integral part</u> of an organization's business processes.



- Provide <u>assurance</u> that the <u>control measures</u> to prevent incidents/accidents are being <u>effectively implemented</u>.
- Lastly, without the <u>right safety culture</u>, even the most definitive metrics, will <u>NOT</u> produce
 <u>sustainable</u> process safety performance over the <u>life of process</u>.
- Management's Leadership plays a very important role in creating, developing, shaping and maintaining the right safety culture.



- What is <u>Safety Culture</u>?
 - What is <u>common</u> within a group.
 - Values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies.
 - Beliefs, rules (written and unwritten), <u>knowledge</u>, behaviours, and <u>capabilities</u> specific to safety management.
 - Like it or not, you have already created a safety culture.
- It defines the manner in which process safety is managed.



- Emphasize people
 - Focus efforts on <u>resource</u> that can <u>prevent</u> catastrophic events <u>people</u>.
 - Managers often rely on systems to get work done. The problem is that these systems always involve <u>people</u>.
 - Consequently, <u>people</u> stand between us and catastrophe.
 - Time after time, <u>administrative</u> or <u>engineering controls</u> are relied upon to protect an organization.
 - Time after time, <u>people</u> have failed to use these systems properly.
 - People and organizations have suffered the consequences.



- Habit and culture are the efficiency and sustainability tools for excellence.
- <u>Mental alertness</u> is <u>critical</u> in safety, however, it is <u>unrealistic and impractical</u> to expect <u>cognitive mental processes</u> to <u>control every action</u>.
- When something becomes <u>habitual</u>, it is applied regardless of the environment.
- The organization's culture is your most <u>effective sustainability mechanism</u>.



Take a look at the word

"HABIT"

What does this word mean to you?



- Remember
 - Good habits take a very long time to cultivate.
 - Bad habits can form very easily and fast.
 - Once entrenched they are very <u>difficult to eradicate</u>.
 - Safety culture itself is <u>NOT enforceable</u>.



- What does a <u>WEAK safety culture</u> look like?
 - Widespread, routine procedural violations.
 - <u>Failure</u> to comply with the company's own SMS.
 - Management decisions that appear <u>consistently</u> to put <u>production</u> before <u>safety</u>.
 - Natural and <u>unconscious bias</u> for production over safety.
 - Accepts or normalized <u>increasingly poor</u> safety performance.
 - Tendency to focus on the <u>short-term</u>.
 - Relies solely on <u>few individuals</u> or <u>management</u> to determine process safety hazards and risk management activities.



- What does a <u>STRONG safety culture</u> look like?
 - Integrate process safety into the core values of the organization.
 - Focus on potential failures and strive to understand the risk and control it.
 - Seek to <u>provide resources proportional</u> to the perceived needs.
 - Place <u>emphasis</u> on <u>learning from mistakes</u> in order to prevent future problems.
 - Employees at <u>ALL levels</u>
 - Identify hazard.
 - Take action to address risks.



- A plant has reactors which pressure is normally operating at 40kg/cm²G.
- The 1st Plant Manager placed a instruction notice on DCS panel to remind the Shift Leader to kill or shut down immediately when the reactor operating pressure reaches 50kg/cm²G. The Shift Leader had the full authority and NOT required to seek approval from him.
- When the 2nd Plant Manager took over from the 1st plant manager, the instruction notice was removed from the DCS panel. The Shift Leader MUST seek approval from Plant Manager to kill or shutdown the reactor.




- Questions
 - Would the Shift Leader have <u>sufficient time</u> to shut down the reactor safety?
 - Consider the time duration between <u>when reactor at High High Pressure alarm</u> and <u>the plant manager approved</u>, the <u>time allowance</u> for board man to shut down the reactor, especially when the event happened between <u>12.00am and 6:00am</u>.
 - How would employees look at the change?
- This case illustrates that
 - Different Managers had different
 - Management styles.
 - Priority settings.



Pipe Alpha 1988

- Big fire on Piper Alpha platform could be seen from <u>Claymore</u> and <u>Tartan</u> platforms.
- <u>Claymore</u> and <u>Tartan</u> platforms delivered the <u>high</u> <u>pressure oil and gas</u> to the <u>Pipe Alpha</u> platform <u>fueling the fire.</u>
- Tartan and Claymore's continued production forced <u>continuous fuel</u> into the blaze, <u>prevent</u> the <u>fire</u> from <u>burning out</u>.
- Manager did <u>NOT</u> shut down the flow of oil and gas to Piper Alpha platform.
- Manager contacted <u>Occidental Control Center</u> seek <u>approval</u> to shutdown.





- The fire <u>would have burnt out</u> were it <u>NOT</u> being fed with oil and gas <u>continuously</u> from both the Tartan and the Claymore platforms.
- When the manager received the <u>approval</u> from the Control Centre, it was <u>too late</u> to shut down the platform.
- The <u>reluctant attitude to shut down</u> illustrates the <u>paralysing effect</u> of an <u>industry mind-set</u> that could <u>NOT</u> shut down production.
- The <u>enormous losses</u> entailed would surely bring <u>career-ending consequence</u> to the <u>individual</u> who took such a <u>decision</u>.
- Today the talk is <u>safety first</u>, <u>production second</u>, <u>BUT</u> it would need a <u>brave person</u> to <u>HIT</u> that button.



MANANGEMENT RESPONSES TO BEFORE INCIDENTS

- What management would have said about their safety performance the day <u>BEFORE</u> the incident?
 - Our safety performance was <u>excellent</u>, safety is always our <u>number one</u> and <u>over-riding</u> <u>priority</u>.
 - My facility has operated for decades without incident...
 - This is a very common reaction and response.
 - Catastrophic incidents do <u>NOT</u> occur often, and it is <u>usual</u> for a facility to have <u>incident-free operations</u> for <u>many years before tragedy strikes</u>.
 - Aware the dangers of operating on a <u>false sense of security</u> based on an <u>incident-free</u> <u>past</u>.
 - Maintain a <u>sense of vulnerability</u> to ensure that process hazards are adequately controlled.

MANANGEMENT RESPONSES TO AFTER INCIDENTS

- What management would say about their safety performance the day <u>AFTER</u> the incident?
 - Accident happened because of worker negligence.
 - Based on our investigation, we are convinced this accident took place because of a <u>single</u>,
 <u>isolated departure</u> from a <u>clearly established procedure</u>.
 - 74 reactors around the world employ the same basic design. "These reactors have been operating for more than 1,300 reactor years without an incident."
 - 1 in 100,000 years, 1E-5/year



MANANGEMENT RESPONSES TO AFTER INCIDENTS

- Our safety record was <u>impeccable</u>. We have taken every precaution we know how. We must remember this is first time in <u>12 years</u> we have casualties.
 - Note: <u>167 fatalities</u> in <u>12 years</u>.
 - Compare with criteria 1 fatality in 1000 years, we want such event frequency less than 1E-6/year at a level broadly general accepted.



MANANGEMENT RESPONSES TO AFTER INCIDENTS


ACCIDENTS DON'T JUST HAPPEN BY CHANCE

- Accidents are the <u>outcome</u> of a <u>series of safety management system failures</u>, it is <u>NOT</u> a <u>fault</u> of a <u>single person</u>.
- Management's Leadership plays a very <u>important</u> role in creating, developing, shaping and maintaining the <u>right safety culture</u>.



AREAS OF PSM STANDARDS WHERE OSHA ISSUED THE MOST CITATIONS

- This document published in <u>2017</u> highlights <u>areas</u> of the PSM standard where <u>OSHA issued</u> the <u>most citations</u> during the Petroleum Refinery PSM National Emphasis Program (NEP).
 - Process Safety Information (PSI)
 - Process Hazards Analysis (PHA)
 - Operating Procedures
 - Mechanical Integrity (MI)
 - Management of Change (MOC)





AREAS OF PSM STANDARDS WHERE OSHA ISSUED THE MOST CITATIONS

- The findings of the program revealed many <u>common instances</u> of <u>non-compliance</u> in the petroleum refinery industry, according to the <u>citation issued for violations</u>.
- Review these common instances of non-compliance to ensure that they <u>do NOT exist</u> in your <u>own PSM programs</u>.



MESSAGE TO END THIS PRESENTATION

We must recognize that the materials handle and process are inherently hazardous

TREAT HYDROCARBON WITH RESPECT



PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT THE IMPORTANCE OF MANAGEMENT LEADERSHIP

THE END

