

What is Your SIS Doing When You're Not Watching

Anand Makhija
PAS, Global



Safety Case
Symposium 2018
Singapore

Agenda

- Introduction to Process Safety
- Functional Safety Standards
- Independent Protection Layer Assurance
- SIS and Risk Management

Process Safety

- Situation

- Managing Process Functional Safety and associated Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) in an industrial hazardous process environment, is typically an intensive manual task consuming valuable skilled resources and providing more value to operations than mere compliance.

- Opportunity

- Productivity tools are now available to automate, to a large extent, compliance requirements necessary for analysis, reporting, proof testing and verification of plant safety functions.
- Automating these activities helps with plant availability and reliability whilst minimizing the operational disturbance and resource requirements necessary to perform these tasks
- Analysis of safety performance information is now possible, enabling improvement actions to be taken.
- Safety performance information can now be extracted directly into Process Safety Management dashboards

Consequences

2005 BP Texas City Refinery Explosion 1B\$ economic loss, 15 people killed

Honeywell

Texas City Incident

15th Body Pulled from Refinery Rubble
By KEVIN MORAN
Copyright 2005 Houston Chronicle

TEXAS CITY - The only worker still missing after the explosion of BP's Texas City refinery was found dead in the plant's rubble today, bringing the death toll to 15. At least seven other blast victims, many...




InTech
Industrial Automation, System, and Instrumentation Solutions
Empowering Your Future Operations

Alarms weren't working at Texas City plant
16 August 2005


1994 Texaco Milford Haven Refinery Explosion £ 400M economic loss

- 275 alarms in the 11 minutes before the explosion
- "... warnings of the developing problem were lost in the plethora of instrument alarms triggered in the control room, many of which were unnecessary and registering with increasing frequency, so operators were unable to appreciate what was actually happening ..."




1984 Union Carbide Bhopal Isocyanate Plant Over 3800 people killed

- Few alarms or interlocks in critical locations that might have warned operators of abnormal conditions
- Alarms sounded so many times a week (20 to 30) that no way to know what the siren signified
- Emergency signal was identical to that used for other purposes, including practice drills.
- Alarm at flare tower was non-operational










2010 BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: 40B\$ in economic loss, 11 people killed

- Vital warning systems on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig were switched off at the time of the explosion in order to spare workers being woken by false alarms, a federal investigation has heard.
- The revelation that alarm systems on the rig at the centre of the disaster were disabled came in testimony by a chief technician working for Transocean, the drilling company that owned the rig



IPL – SIS - SIF – A COMPLEX BODY OF KNOWLEDGE



Standards

The Specification, Design, Implementation, Operation, and Maintenance of

- Safety Instrumented Systems (**SISs**), containing
- Safety Instrumented Functions (**SIFs**), as
- Independent Protection Layers (**IPLs**)

are governed by ISA and IEC standards known as the

ANSI-ISA-84.00.01-2004-IEC 61511-1 Functional Safety Series
– containing multiple parts.

This is a **comprehensive** and **complex** body of knowledge.

Keeping track of a variety of issues mandated by these standards has long been an arduous and error-prone task.

Definitions

Relevant Definitions

Process Safety Event: What SIS-SIL-SIF-IPL is there to prevent!

Safety Instrumented System (SIS):

Hardware and software safety controls on critical process systems

Safety Integrity Level (SIL):

The relative level of risk-reduction needed to mitigate a hazard: SIL-1, 2, 3, and 4, each level requiring different design methods.

Safety Instrumented Function (SIF):

A specific control function used to achieve a SIL. An Emergency Shutdown (ESD) is an example of an SIF.

Independent Protection Layer (IPL): A prevention method that is independent of any other such method.

Safety Alarm: an alarm used as an IPL, with a 10% risk reduction credit. Such alarms must have periodic operator training, defined responses, suppression control, and several other administrative and depiction requirements.

Definitions


Relevant Definitions

- **Process Safety Time:**

The amount of time between an initiating event in the process and a hazardous result, if a mitigating safety function is not performed.

- **SIF Design Time:**

The amount of time within which a SIF is designed to successfully complete its mitigating action. The Design Time must always be shorter than the Process Safety Time. This is sometimes called the “response time” of the SIF.




**Example SIF Design Time:
Must fit within Process Safety Time**

Standards

- ISA and IEC standard: ANSI-ISA-84.00.01-2004-IEC 61511-1 Functional Safety Series
- Covers the Specification, Design, Implementation, Operation, and Maintenance of
 - Safety Instrumented Systems (SISs), containing
 - Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs), taken as
 - Independent Protection Layers (IPLs)
- Comprehensive and Complex body of knowledge

Keeping track of a variety of issues mandated by these standards has long been an arduous and error-prone task.

Functional Safety Lifecycle



IPL, SIS and Risk Management

- Taking IPL Credit for Risk Reduction
 - SIF must be defined and communicated
 - Engineered implementation of SIF to achieve a SIL
 - Regular verification (testing) mandated by regulations
 - Bypass system a must for operations
 - Required to startup a plant
 - Required for SIS testing
 - Must be carefully managed
 - Must understand increased risk while in bypass
 - Supplemental Procedures are common to mitigate abnormal risk when in bypass




How are IPLs managed today?

- Spreadsheets
- Written Procedures
 - Operating
 - Bypass
- Manual Testing
 - Maintenance
 - Online
 - Offline
 - Full/Partial stroke
 - Etc.
- Process Drawings
- Work order systems
- Handwritten notes
- Homegrown applications
- Verification of Design Demand Rate



Work Order and Assessment: A1940			
When finished, report the case #, volunteers, hours worked, and initials of resident present during work			
Case #	A1940	Entered by: MHH-Brooklyn NY Stake	Claimed by: MHH-Brooklyn NY Stake
Personal Information		Requested Date	
Today's Date		2013-01-18	
Resident Name	C. [REDACTED]	Primary Work Type	Flood
Address	52 [REDACTED] Brooklyn, NY 11229 (Kings County)	Cross Street	
Phone Number	917. [REDACTED]	Priority (1=high)	3
Best Time to Call		Member	-
Disabled		First Responder	-
Special Needs		Over 60 Years Old	-
Description of Work			
Flood Height (ft)	Appliance Removal	Trees Down	0
Carpet Removal	Standing Water	Large Trees Down (>18')	0
Hardwood Floor	Mold Remediation	Roof Damage	-
		Needed	0
		Work Without Homeowner	-



Disparate solutions with no input controls, no interoperability, limited change tracking, and limited functionality

IPL Management Challenges


- Visibility of current risk
 - Many ways to disable IPLs
 - Manual effort to aggregate and contextualize data
- IPL/SIS/SIF lifecycle challenges
 - Safety system must be highly reliable
 - Testing and validation is highly inefficient and creates risks
 - Consumes Technical and Maintenance resources during turnarounds
 - On-line testing introduces reliability risk and potential lost production
 - SIS demand rate and failure rate are difficult to track, but are required in the standards to track for verification of proper design
 - SIL validation is based on difficult to collect demand and failure data

Consequence of a failure on demand of an IPL/SIF
is a SAFETY CRITICAL EVENT

IPL Analytics – Better way to manage IPL's

Configuration and Design Data for Each SIF


Design Time, Process Safety Time, Testing Interval, Risk, Consequence, Severity, SIL Level, etc.



Name	Type	Description	Equipment	Due Date	Overdue	Days Overdue	Mitigated Risk	Unmitigated Risk	Consequence	Severity	SIL	Protect
421SDV005	Element	Inlet Comp. Discharge Sdv	Compressor	9/2/2014	Yes	675						
421U2028A	Element	Inlet Comp. Seal Gas Superheater	Compressor	2/2/2016	Yes	157						
4E4701 - Superheater Trip	Function	FUEL GAS SUPERHEATER TRIP	Heaters	6/26/2016	Yes	10						
447P2H-008 - Filter Inlet Pressure High High	Function	Filter Inlet Pressure High High	Separators	6/28/2016	Yes	10	Minor		Safety Impact	Safety Severity 3		
421SDV004	Element	Inlet Comp. Suct. Scrubber Cond. Sdv	Compressor	6/28/2016	Yes	10						
421LZLL002 - Scrubber Level Low Low	Function	Inlet Comp. Suct. Scrubber Level Low Low	Compressor	6/30/2016	Yes	8	Major				SIL 3	
443TV101 - MEG Reboiler	Element	MEG Reboiler Tv (Meg Regeneration Unit)	Boiler	7/1/2016	Yes	7						
4C4330	Element	4c4330 Fuel Gas Supply Sdv	Pumps	7/13/2016	No	-5						
421P2L003 -Pressure Low Low	Function	Inlet Comp. Suction Pressure Low Low	Compressor	7/21/2016	No	-13						
421SDV007	Element	Inlet Comp. Seal Gas Supply (Export Gas) Sd	Compressor	7/22/2016	No	-14						


Total # of Overdue Schedules: 7 / 10

Safety System Performance Analysis and Reports



Process and Event Data from the control system

SIF Activation, Success or Failure Verification, Bypass, Un-Bypass, Test, etc.



IPL Assurance Analytics

Benefits



- **Assures the Safety System is Functional**
 - Automated notification of failures to appropriate personnel
 - Bypass management, SIS availability, and risk assessment
- **Reduced production interruptions**
 - Use DOSS event as SIS test
 - Reduction in on-line testing
- **Improved Turnaround Efficiency**
 - Reduction in validation testing during turnarounds
- **Accurate SIL determination**
 - Process demands and failures are documented every activation
 - Improved accuracy of validation testing; “proof test” at process conditions
 - demand rate for verifying design
- **Complete documentation of all safety functions and testing**
 - Maintenance forecasting for testing plans
 - Audit evidence as required by IEC 61508 and IEC 61511

IPL Dashboard: Actionable Data Analytics

Safety System and Safety Device Assessment
Integration of Safety Functions and Risk

- PHA Risk Assessment
- IPL Service Status
- PM Maintenance

Unified view of safety critical devices



IPL Management: Critical Success Factors

- On demand, current visualization of risk
- Assures the safety system is functional
 - Automated notification of failures to appropriate personnel
 - Bypass management, SIS availability, and risk assessment
- Reduced production interruptions
 - Use DOSS event as SIS test
 - Reduction in on-line testing
- Improved turnaround efficiency
 - Reduction in validation testing during turnarounds
- Accurate SIL determination
 - Process demands and failures are documented every activation
 - Improved accuracy of validation testing; “proof test” at process conditions
 - Demand rate for verifying design
- Complete documentation of all safety functions and testing
 - Maintenance forecasting for testing plans
 - Audit evidence as required by IEC 61508 and IEC 61511



Questions

Anand Makhija

PAS, Global



**Safety Case
Symposium 2018
Singapore**

www.SafetyCaseSymposium.com